CONCLUSION
Initial observers of globalization assumed that global integration would lead to increased democratization and free exchange of goods and ideas. While the advent of the internet, telecommunications, and travel have integrated nearly all corners of the world, globalization has not resulted in a democratic “world without borders,” but rather in asymmetrical power imbalances among nations. Now, the most important borders in international relations are not the physical barriers between states, but the command of expanding jurisdictions enabled by new patterns of globalization.
Gaining power in today’s geopolitical climate requires much more than military might, and market size. For decades, the United States and other major powers have reaped the benefits of a globalized world through their strategic command over international networks of trade, information, and finance. The centrality of the U.S. financial system, for example, has provided the country with significant benefits including the dollar’s status as the leading international reserve currency, the ability to observe international transactions, and the capacity to enforce sanctions on its adversaries. This is only one example of a structural power the U.S. gained through an interdependent world, and there are many more.
China enters the contemporary geopolitical climate from a unique position. Although the nation has a thousands years long track record of being an international powerhouse, China spent most of the twentieth century isolated from the global economy. In this context, China’s economic ascent is surely an impressive phenomenon. As discussed in Chapter 1, China is facing limitations to its growth; an aging population, low value-adding economy, and protectionist policy all threaten the stability of the country. Despite rising in international influence, China, like many other nations is still stymied by the “liberal world order” established by nations like the U.S. and is ready to break free of those holds. China has articulated a new vision for the world order, one in which countries can rise above structural constraints and make their own way in the international system as individuals.
Interdependence and structural power literature both attempt to explain the power dynamics of globalization. These literatures provide important contexts to China’s recent shift towards investment in strategic technologies such as digital currency and satellites. As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s investment in these new forms of technology is calculated. China’s digital yuan serves as a legitimate threat to the American financial system, and the BeiDou satellite system increases China’s international prestige, military capabilities, and ability to provide both economic opportunities and security to partnering nations. These two examples are merely pieces of a larger puzzle. What this discussion suggests, is that there is a marked shift in both Chinese industrial policy and in the ways in which China is engaging with the international community. If structural power and interdependence theorists are correct, then China’s challenge has incredible potential to disrupt the liberal world order.
I began this paper by chronicling China’s economic ascent and explaining some of the most pressing limitations affecting Chinese growth. My primary assumption is that if China is going to sustain its economic miracle, and bolster its status as a hegemon, it needs to reimagine its role in the international political economy. This observation led directly into the ideological and policy implications of Made in China 2025. An in-depth review of both interdependence and structural power literature provided context for why China is ramping up its development of key technologies. Two case studies, China’s DCEP and the BeiDou satellite system provide concrete examples of China’s investment in areas of high-interdependence and their implications for contemporary power structures.
I do not claim to know whether these examples indicate a new world order is forming in which China is the predominant global hegemon. Nor am I claiming that a loss of American control of key systems results in a proportionate gain for China. On the contrary, a myriad of factors (downstream technological innovation, new alliance structures, and policy decisions) will influence the political developments of upcoming decades. What is significant however, is that despite the rise of populist and nationalist ideologies throughout the globe, integrated networks, whether financial, diplomatic, trade, or technological, will remain key sources of state power. As China continues to evolve its geopolitical strategy in the information-age, it will have interdependence in mind. Therefore, it will be increasingly important for scholars in the upcoming decades to pay close attention to the underlying structures targeted and affected by Chinese policy decisions.