Crisis
The ExComm had to address two questions: What were the actual military and political significance of the missiles, and what should be done about them? Opinions ranged widely. Initially, McNamara argued they had no military value. Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of defense, and others strongly disagreed and argued for a “surgical” air strike to destroy the sites. Prompting by Kennedy revealed such a strike would not be “surgical.” Collateral damage would be inevitable, killing Soviet personnel and Cubans. As reality sank in, a consensus emerged for a naval blockade or “quarantine” of Cuba. The latter term was preferable to declaring a blockade, which under international law constitutes an act of war.31
Within a broader context, ExComm members employed legal and moral arguments in their initial discussion. Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University and others have observed that the US blockade was questionable on legal grounds.32 The White House developed a legal brief defending the move. While Kennedy gave less weight to the United Nations than his three predecessors, he wanted the evidence of Soviet actions presented to that body and the Organization of American States.33 His concerns included preventing arguments that the United States was the aggressor.34 Moral considerations also played a role. Most notably, Attorney General Robert Kennedy objected to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s suggestion of a surprise air attack on the missile sites, comparing it to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. An irritated Acheson made clear his disdain for the attorney general’s reasoning. Elie Abel, in one of the first and most insightful published analyses of the crisis, emphasized Kennedy’s concern for restraint and skepticism about keeping military action limited.35
On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. With self-control evident throughout the crisis, the president read aloud his September statement on the definition of offensive missiles. Gromyko, who must
30. Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch of the Arrows (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
31. “The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Médecins Sans Frontières (website), n.d., https://guide -humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/blockade/, Doctors Without Borders provides background on the subject in the context of providing humanitarian relief; and Abel, Missile Crisis, 59, Leonard C. Meeker, deputy legal adviser to the State Department, suggested the term “quarantine.”
32. Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), also describes managing the crisis as Kennedy’s “finest hour,” 297.
33. Abel, Missile Crisis, 73; and Sorensen, Decision-Making, 796–97.
34. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 807–12, indicates the importance of the UN dimension and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s role.
35. Abel, Missile Crisis, 50, 66–67, 78.
have known about the missiles and therefore was lying, repeated past Soviet assurances. Kennedy said nothing in response and, through silence, maintained American initiative. Bundy later argued this was the critical moment that sealed the American case for Soviet duplicity and dishonesty: “It made all the difference— I felt then and have felt since—that the Russians were caught pretending, in a clumsy way, that they had not done what it was clear to the whole world they had in fact done.”36
On October 22, after the text of Kennedy’s address to the nation on the Soviet missiles in Cuba had been reviewed and rechecked, the president delivered the televised speech. He summarized the situation in Cuba and listed the initial moves taken by Washington, stressing these were only the first steps:
acceleration of surveillance of Cuba;
a “quarantine,” the euphemism for naval blockade, would be imposed around Cuba;
a clear declaration that any missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as a Soviet attack on the United States and would bring a full American response against the Soviet Union;
a call immediately to convene the Organization of American States to consider the threat;
a call to convene an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council; and
a personal appeal to Khrushchev to “abandon this course.”37
A week of extraordinary tension followed. On October 24, the Soviet Union had diverted 12 of 25 ships on course for Cuba, presumably because they carried military cargo. The following day, influential columnist Walter Lippmann proposed trading Soviet missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey that vexed Khrushchev. Soviet officials assumed Lippmann was publicly presenting a White House suggestion. In fact, ExComm members put exceptional weight on private meetings between Alexander S. Fomin, a Soviet embassy official, and
36. Abel, Missile Crisis, footnote, 64.
37. Abel, Missile Crisis, 104–6; and Schlesinger, Decision-Making, 812–13.
John Scali, an American journalist, with the former assumed to have a direct line to Soviet leaders.38
The evening of Thursday, October 25, witnessed the start of a dangerous duel off the coast of Cuba between a Soviet submarine and United States surface ships and aircraft, which came close to starting a nuclear war. Soviet submarine B-59, spotted and identified by US aircraft, became the target of devices dropped by antisubmarine surface ships as signals to surface. Explosive charges banged on the sides of the hull and generated severe pulses that made breathing difficult.39
On Saturday, October 27, the duel escalated further. Three US destroyers, the Beale, Cony, and Murray, unsuccessfully tried to establish contact and then began dropping practice depth charges followed by hand grenades. The atmosphere in the Soviet submarine was becoming extremely hot, with carbon dioxide rising to dangerous levels as equipment began to break down. Men began to pass out and collapse. B-59 Commander Valentin Savitsky tried to shake off the relentless pursuers for four hours without success. The presence of the potentially lethal Americans on the surface reinforced the claustrophobia and anxiety experienced by the crew of the Soviet submarine.40
Finally, exhausted and enraged, Savitsky ordered the officer responsible for the vessel’s atomic torpedo to arm and prepare the weapon for launch. The US Navy also had nuclear torpedoes but gave them less priority. Nuclear weapons occupy a distinct dimension—separate weapons in kind and degree. The Soviets were more inclined to regard armed conflict as one continuum, at least through the introduction of smaller nuclear weapons. This belief reflects the Soviet total war doctrine, which involves a perspective different from the United States.41
On the precipice of nuclear war, Arkhipov made an unconventional move and intervened. He was the chief of staff for the submarine flotilla, with a rank equal to Savitsky but without direct-line authority over this specific vessel. His presence on this submarine proved extraordinarily fortunate.42
The B-59 surfaced to recharge low batteries and secure desperately needed fresh air. The US destroyer Cory was close by and aircraft hit the Russian officers
38. Abel, Missile Crisis, 155–58; and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Vintage, 2009), Dobbs argues Fomin (a.k.a Feklisov) had no significant influence; and Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 200, 271, disagrees and indicates influence.
39. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267.
40. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267–68.
41. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 355–79. Throughout the book, he compares Soviet and US approaches to strategy, with the former emphasizing maximum force, the latter much more inclined to intellectualize. US President Ronald Reagan’s update of containment and Soviet reactions is particularly instructive.
42. Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya (Washington, DC/Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Press/Stanford University Press, 2012), 137. This book further confirms Arkhipov’s presence on B-59.
with blinding searchlights and flares, as they walked up to the submarine’s deck, to confirm identification and photograph the submarine. The flares made loud booming noises as they exploded. American planes flew low over the submarine and fired tracer bullets into the water. Savitsky, driven beyond endurance, decided this was indeed war, and possibly general hostilities had already begun between the two superpowers. He ordered the nuclear torpedo readied for firing. Torpedo tubes on the Soviet submarine opened. The US Pentagon had assured civilian superiors that Moscow was informed these explosive devices were purely for signaling. The Soviet government, however, never acknowledged receipt of this message and never relayed the contents of the message to commanders on the scene.43
Arkhipov successfully dissuaded Savitsky with American help. He demonstrated impressive interpersonal skills and the advantage of equal rank. Savitsky calmed down, and the psychology of intense crisis gave way to a willingness to at least reconsider. Vadim Orlov, the head of the signals intelligence team on the submarine, revealed Arkhipov’s heroism in detail many years later.44
Commander William Morgan, captain of the destroyer Cory, remained calm throughout the ordeal. He ordered Ensign Gary Slaughter to transmit by searchlight signals an apology to the Soviet military men on deck for the dangerous, aggressive behavior of the American pilots. Slaughter’s message quickly compensated for the reckless airmen, provided a reassuring tonic to the Soviets on the submarine, and effectively defused the situation. Arkhipov saw the dramatic signal and alerted his comrades. Savitsky, reluctant throughout to commence hostilities, grasped the importance of Morgan’s gesture. He ordered the torpedo tubes, which had been open and pointing at the Cory, to close. One of the tubes contained the atomic torpedo. Slaughter remembered later that Arkhipov had quickly gestured to him in reply to acknowledge with appreciation the American signal. Slaughter also reported the follow-up order he received from Morgan: “Keep that Russian bastard happy.”45
The early sentiments of a majority of ExComm members, under tremendous emotional pressure, had been to respond to the Soviet missile deployments in Cuba with a conventional military attack. Stresses resulting from the US naval blockade and the ongoing direct yet uncertain Soviet-American military confrontation were
43. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 299–300; and Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267–68. US President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara clearly believed Soviet Navy personnel were aware the explosions were from purely signaling devices. They were not.
44. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 303, 317, 399.
45. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 271.
comparable. Not surprisingly, Soviets on the islands—and at sea—had similar desires to strike back militarily. The Cubans shared this sentiment as well.46