Lessons Learned
The passage of 60 years has brought significant new information on the Cuban Missile Crises and altered the understanding of the factors contributing to the events—the actual dangers at the time and the roles of principals on both sides. To a remarkable degree, vital dimensions of the confrontation and resolution of the crisis were kept secret for many years. Some of the most pivotal aspects, such as the B-59 incident and Arkhipov’s heroism, became public recently. Others actions, such as the intense US efforts to assassinate Castro, became public in the mid-1970s through hearings of the special US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.54
The Eisenhower administration managed a successful secret program to topple dangerous regimes, including those in Guatemala, Iran, and probably the Congo. The now well-known CIA effort to assassinate Castro, which included cooperation with organized crime, began under Eisenhower. The operation was accelerated following the Bay of Pigs invasion and was directly supervised by Robert Kennedy. Castro knew of this effort and alluded to it on at least one public occasion.55
A review of the lessons learned strongly reconfirms the twin difficulties of accurate perception of developments and effective crisis management. Wohlstetter produced seminal work on the difficulty of separating accurate “signals” of an opponent’s intentions from the sea of confusing information “noise” surrounding them. She applied pathbreaking analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack to the missile crisis. Technology can complicate and clarify in this regard. Kennedy administration officials appear to have been misled by a combination of false
53. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 23.
54. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 7, 12–14, 129–31, 138, 338.
55. Powers, Man Who Kept Secrets, 106–7, 119–22, 132–58.
assumptions about Soviet intentions and false confidence related to advancing photoreconnaissance capabilities rapidly. The U-2 flights over Cuba revealed the Soviet missile ploy only just in time and thanks to the persistence of one official— John McCone, who illustrates the vital human dimension.56
Kennedy’s performance is highly commendable. In the prelude to the Bay of Pigs invasion, he did what Eisenhower would never do— signed off on an operation without a thorough, detailed review. Kennedy questioned and expressed concern but delegated the details.57
In the missile crisis, Kennedy demonstrated the reverse behavior, including constant skepticism, probing questions, and innovative approaches. He absented himself from discussions to facilitate freedom of debate and interchange by subordinates likely to be intimidated by his presence. The president surreptitiously taped conversations of ExComm, a practice begun after the Bay of Pigs invasion. The transcripts confirm a striking sentiment early in the crisis favoring a military attack. Kennedy skillfully deflected this view. The quarantine of Cuba bought time. Finally, he moved decisively to resolve the crisis by privately accepting the Cuba-Turkey missile trade. Kennedy guided people and the crisis to an acceptable resolution through attentiveness, inquisitiveness, skepticism, and initiative.
The Cuban Missile Crisis reconfirmed the importance of the human factor in human affairs, including military competition. A related conclusion is that abstract analysis of matters, often conducted under the label of game theory, is of limited value. Working hard to understand the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is vital. McNamara, in particular, publicly emphasized this theme.58
In the last 60 years, a tendency has emerged to minimize the danger of nuclear war. This perspective reflects wishful thinking and the relative security of the post–Cold War international system. For example, Harvard University Professor Steven Pinker in 2018 wrote, “The records show that Khrushchev and Kennedy remained in firm control of their governments.”59 This viewpoint, with
56. Abel, Missile Crisis, 7–8, 12–16; and Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
57. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 321–27.
58. James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). See Errol Morris, dir., The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (New York: Sony Pictures Classic, 2003), https://www .errolmorris.com/film/fow.html.
59. Steven Pinker, Enlightenment NOW: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (New York: Viking/Penguin RandomHouse, 2018), 312.
no further comment, provides powerful evidence for review and reanalysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis and other high-stakes crises.
In the end, Kennedy possessed important partners on the other side. Khrushchev resisted enormous military pressures within his government, agreed to remove the missiles, and stepped back from Armageddon, which was paramount. Arkhipov and Morgan, his American counterpart, also played essential roles. Understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict and vital regarding nuclear war— the ultimate holocaust.
Arthur I. Cyr
Dr. Arthur I. Cyr has served as the vice president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and president of the Chicago World Trade Center. He has taught at the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, Northwestern University, and Carthage College (Clausen Distinguished Professor) and is the author of After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia (New York University Press, 2000) and other books and articles. Cyr graduated from UCLA, received a PhD in political science from Harvard University, and served in the US Army.
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