Resolution
Meanwhile, on October 26, ExComm officials received a long, rambling, and conciliatory message from Khrushchev. The following day Radio Moscow broadcast a harsh, inflexible message, insisting on the Cuba-Turkey missile trade, which the White House publicly stated was unacceptable. That same day an American U-2 inadvertently penetrated Soviet airspace, leading the Kennedy administration to observe wryly that there “is always some so-and-so who doesn’t get the word.”47 Even more ominous, a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 over Cuba and killed the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. The Soviets on the ground, isolated without communications and under pressure, fired. Wisely, Washington maintained self-control and did not attack SAM sites or other targets in Cuba.48
Kennedy and the ExComm decided to ignore the second tougher message and accept the first conciliatory one. Known only to a select few, Robert Kennedy assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that if the Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba, the United States would remove its missiles from Turkey. The US withdrawal would occur after a sufficient interval to avoid the appearance of direct trade. On October 28, Moscow publicly accepted the American offer to pledge not to invade Cuba after the missiles were removed.49
Kennedy, suffering criticism since the Bay of Pigs invasion, realized the extent of the victory.50 According to Schlesinger, Kennedy was relieved and fatalistic, observing: “Now is the night to go to the theatre, like Abraham Lincoln.”51
What were the Soviet motivations for placing missiles in Cuba? Opinions varied widely within the ExComm. They were an inexpensive way to secure nuclear weapons equivalence with the United States. Additionally, they could deter the invasion of Cuba, the claim consistently emphasized later by Soviet officials.52
Regarding the balance of nuclear forces, the ExComm members, by fall 1962, were aware the alleged “missile gap” with the Soviet Union was nonexistent. Yet, there seemed little realistic appreciation of how inferior the Soviet forces were. Khrushchev was under enormous pressure to maintain substantial nuclear and
46. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 66–68.
47. Abel, Missile Crisis, 173.
48. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 827.
49. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 428–45; Schlesinger, Decision-Making, 830; and Sorensen, Decision-Making, 807–9.
50. Sorensen, Decision-Making, 798.
51. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 830.
52. See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 10–12.
conventional military forces while responding to growing demands to provide resources for the consumer sectors of the Soviet economy.53
The United States’ credibility to defend Europe in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states would have been reduced if there were strategic missiles in Cuba. Although Moscow’s initial plan for installations appeared to involve 64 missiles, there is no indication the Soviets would have stopped there. While missiles in Cuba most likely would not have resulted in true nuclear parity with the United States, they would have significantly evened the imbalance. The true strategic balance notwithstanding, Soviet missiles in Cuba would have changed perceptions regarding the balance of power, and perceptions matter in international affairs.