Reaction
Bundy presented the evidence to Kennedy, but not until the following morning. Meanwhile, the always-efficient aide systematically double-checked and reviewed the evidence and prepared answers to the questions he anticipated from Kennedy.25 There were no long-range missiles in these photographs, but there was telling evidence. Experienced photo analysts pointed to missile erectors, launchers, and trailers, all placed within a signature trapezoidal area. A SAM site guarded each corner of the trapezoid. This additional detail was congruent with the profile of intermediate- and medium-range missile deployments inside the Soviet Union.26
When compared with earlier photographs, the pace of constructing temporary launching sites was remarkably rapid, with clear evidence of permanent missile sites. The Soviets were constructing 24 launching pads for medium-range missiles that could be used more than once and 16 for intermediate-range missiles. A total of 42 medium-range missiles were known to be brought into Cuba.27
Kennedy and his advisers were stunned by a Soviet move contrary to their assumptions and Moscow’s reassurances. In one of the most insightful analyses of the missile crisis, Roberta Wohlstetter describes the American reaction.28 The move was not a function of naiveté, for this administration emphasized worldliness and hard-nosed realism; it was out of character based on history. Kennedy was concerned about other disastrous experiences (such as the Bay of Pigs invasion), while the White House escalated efforts to overthrow Castro covertly.29
Perhaps because official advisers had been mistaken, Kennedy relied from the start of the crisis on an ad hoc handpicked team, later titled the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). This informal approach
24. Abel, Missile Crisis, 31–32, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was more skeptical, 38.
25. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 801–2.
26. Abel, Missile Crisis, 28–29, 43, 46–47.
27. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 796.
28. Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs (July 1965): 691–707.
29. See Mark J. White, ed., The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 78–80 and passim.
is notable and consistent with the practices of other presidents throughout American history.30