CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

January 6, 2021, was a cold day in Washington, D.C. The weather hovered in the low 40s Fahrenheit, but the temperature of the crowd at the “Save America” rally was heating up. President Trump implored the crowd, “if you don’t fight like hell, we won’t get our country back” (Groeger et al., 2021, video 24). Before the former President was done speaking, parts of the crowd had made their way down Pennsylvania Avenue and were already pushing at the gates of the US Capitol building. Some of these individuals were members of far right organizations that had planned and were now carrying out an attack on the Capitol. Inside the building, the members of the United States Congress, along with Vice President Mike Pence, were in the process of certifying the election results. The process continued until the crowd breached the building.

This event lasted just over four hours, but its historical significance cannot be measured, at least not yet. It has been called a breach, a riot, a siege, an insurrection, and a coup d’état. Regardless of label, it was both planned and executed using the internet. It was also live streamed and uploaded to the internet in real time. Video after video of the day shows people with phones out. It is known that far right actors and groups took part in the events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. The far right has used the internet since the early 1980s. The progression of the far right’s persistent presence and its ability to harness the internet to further its agenda represents a danger to civil society.

This paper begins by defining the far right and outlining how and why the far right is considered extremist. It then investigates the history and current state of the far right’s presence on the internet, followed by theoretical frameworks from the field of social science to help in understanding the far right. A visual and audio analysis of the events of January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol is undertaken and results show that cyber and physical spaces merged into one space on that day and imagery was prevalent in those spaces, serving as a source of solidarity and purpose for the participants.

The following sections of chapter one cover the research problem and hypothesis, the type of research, and definitions. The definitions section covers the far right, extremism, internet presence, and imagery. These sections contain historical information where appropriate to both provide context and reflect the Master’s program of study.

Research Problem and Hypothesis

This thesis explores how the far right uses cyber and real life spaces in tandem and how imagery facilitates this process. This question arose after witnessing various flags being flown, taken down and then re-flown around the rural areas of the High Desert of Southern California during the run up to the November 2020 election. The High Desert is known to be conservative leaning with a lot of support for former President Trump and it is also known to have individuals who are part of the far right movement. The observations of the flags spurred further questions: why were the flags going up and down, was there some type of message being sent, and where would discussion of this occur? This led to research on the far right, especially concerning their use of internet spaces in conjunction with real life events, and how imagery facilitates this process. This research led to a hypothesis that the internet was integral to the events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol and that imagery was a major factor in creating solidarity and purpose among the participants.

Type of Research

Research was conducted to explore this question, including the reading of several books, scholarly articles, and journalism articles. First it was important to understand the history of the far right, especially their online presence. Research into far right imagery and the mediums on which they predominantly appear was also conducted. To reflect the Master’s program of study completed concurrently to writing this thesis, an interdisciplinary approach from the lens of social science, using theories of anthropology, geography, sociology, and political science, was taken, while historical background was provided where appropriate. In addition, the growing global nature of the far right was also explored to reflect the Master’s course of study.

Defining the Far Right

Professor and director of the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) at American University, Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2020) offers a comprehensive definition of the far right. Miller-Idriss’s (2020) research of the far right includes field work done in both the United States and Germany. She places the far right into “four separate but overlapping categories: antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals, exclusionary beliefs, existential threats and conspiracies, and apocalyptic fantasies’’ (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 4). The practices and ideals of the antigovernment and antidemocratic portion of the far right seek to undermine democratic ideals around the globe. Miller-Idriss (2020) cites “disinformation campaigns, election interference, attacks on the freedom of the press, violating the constitutional protection of minority rights, or using violence and terrorism to achieve political goals” as actions taken by these groups, who often form into paramilitary groups and militias in the United States and in Europe form third parties who put forth candidates for office, sometimes being successful. Miller-Idriss (2020) notes that in the United States the lack of influential third parties resulted in far right candidates running as Republicans and attempting to sway the party from within (p. 5). This can be seen in their adoption of some of the far right’s talking points and specifically their use of exclusionary and dehumanizing language.

This language reflects the far right category of exclusionary beliefs. The belief system of the far right is hierarchical and includes “racist, anti-immigrant, nativist, nationalist, white-supremacist, anti-Islam, anti-Semitic, and antiLGBTQ+” beliefs (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 6). Individuals and groups seen as inferior in this hierarchy can be subjected to language that is meant to dehumanize them and therefore make hate and violence aimed in their direction easier. These beliefs and language also aim to “preserve the superiority and dominance of some groups over others” (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 8). The far right utilizes this language often to target immigrants and nonwhites and they see demographic changes that will make Europe and North America browner and blacker as a threat.

This threat is the basis for the far right category Miller-Idriss (2020) refers to as “existential demographic threats and dystopian conspiracy theories” (p. 9). Overall, this concern is referred to in the global far right as the “great replacement.” The “great replacement” specifically is seen as a purposeful global plan to replace white Christians with nonwhites and non-Christians. The far right charges that this plan is being carried out by national and global elites, specifically Jews, who are a popular target of far right conspiracy theorists, both historically and in the present (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The fear is that due to immigration and refugees, in addition to demographic patterns like lower birth rates in European and North American countries, a “white genocide” will occur. The term “white genocide” is used more often in North America, while in Europe the term “Eurabia” is more often used to reflect the perceived threat from Muslim immigration to the continent (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). The term “great replacement” was created by French far right scholar Renaud Camus in 2011 and has been used as a “framework” to embed the various far right conspiracies and existential threats (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p. 9). This shared perception of the threat of immigration and demographic change is also a unifying one among the global far right and is seen as a common cause for action (Miller-Idriss, 2020, p.11; see also Baele et al., 2020). Miller-Idriss (2020) recounts just some of the recent instances of far right violence where the perpetrator has been inspired by these ideas: the Norway attack in 2011, the 2019 Christchurch attack, the 2018 Pittsburgh Synagogue attack, and the 2019 El Paso Walmart attack. Indeed, the killers often reference each other in online writings they post before their attacks. According to Miller-Idriss (2020), over the last few years an important change has occurred, the far right does not just use conspiracy theories to “frame far-right ideas,” rather “they are motivating violent action” (p.12).

The final of Miller-Idriss’s four categories to describe the far right is apocalyptic fantasies. On the extreme far right, the belief is that the conspiracies discussed previously will lead to an imminent apocalypse, which some of the far right want to accelerate. These actors see the coming apocalypse as necessary to enable the creation of the “ethnostate,” the creation of a white, Christian homeland. Accelerationists want to speed up this process by instigating societal chaos, sometimes expressed by the desire to engage in race war (in America) and to bring on the collapse of democratic government, or Day X (in Germany) (Bennhold, K., 2021).

In this paper, the term “far right” will be used to discuss the individuals and groups that follow, engage in, and believe the phenomena described in the previous section. Among the literature and scholars, there is no one accepted term for this phenomenon. Idriss-Miller’s (2020) discussion of contested labels stresses that the label “far right” is the “best bad term” available and that it “must always be used and understood as representing a spectrum of beliefs and approaches” (p. 18).

What Makes the Far Right Extremist?

Extremism researcher JM Berger’s (2018) definition of extremism “refers to the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against the out-group” (p. 44). Utilizing Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner’s (1978) Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, Berger has created a framework for understanding extremism. Berger (2018) builds on Tajfel and Turner’s (1978) ideas of in-groups and out-groups. Berger (2018) explains that identity is something that is created, and people often identify with many groups based on different ways they see themselves; they are part of in-groups based on the perception of a shared identity (p. 6). These groups can be simple, for example based on living in a common city, or being fans of the same sports teams. However, some in-groups are more involved and over time details and events experienced by the groups collate into an in-group narrative (Berger, 2018, p. 53). Parallel to an in-group’s development is the development of the out-group, those not eligible for in-group status. Berger (2018) notes that extremist in-groups clearly define boundaries regarding who qualifies for the in-group, more so than non-extremist in-groups, where boundaries may be blurrier and of lower stake. An extremist in-group eliminates “gray areas” by explicitly outlining the answers to the following questions:

What makes an individual part of the group, why the in-group has legitimacy, what makes an individual part of the out-group, why the outgroup is less legitimate than the in-group, and how members of the ingroup should interact with members of the out-group? (p. 53).

The in-group builds its own identity by addressing these questions and by creating and articulating its beliefs, traits, and practices. The practices of the ingroup are formed from past, current, and future behavior. Berger (2018) argues that over time, this all coalesces into the in-group’s “story of us” (p. 54).

For extremist in-groups, the story of the out-group, though, is created and viewed much differently. Since none of the in-group members are part of the outgroup, firsthand knowledge is often lacking and information about the out-group is often based on less reliable sources. Further, Berger notes that the in-group’s definition of the out-group tends to be negative, even toxic, and the in-group highlights negative data about the out-group while rebutting or ignoring positive data. The story of the out-group “usually includes a mix of truth, interpretation, and fiction” (p. 57). This dynamic is only considered extremist, following Berger’s framework, if the in-group asserts that hostile action must be taken against the out-group, because they believe that otherwise the success and survival of the in-group cannot be assured. This is the line that Berger uses to delineate hate or run of the mill in-group/out-group tensions, or even some forms of violence, from extremism: hostile action. Hostile actions range from shunning and discrimination to violence and at the extreme, genocide.

Extremist in-groups frame the need for hostile action as a solution to a crisis. The crisis arises from the “belief an out-group must be impeding the ingroup’s success in some way, and that impedance proceeds from the intrinsic identity of the out-group” (Berger, 2018, p. 76). There are five common crisis narratives identified by Berger: impurity, conspiracy, dystopia, existential threat and apocalypse (pps. 82-83). Since extremists believe the out-group is impeding the success of the in-group through these actions that comprise the crisis narratives, the in-groups propose the required solution. Solutions, as articulated the extremists, include harassment, discrimination, segregation, hate crimes, terrorism, oppression, war and genocide (Berger, 2018, pps. 99-100).

Returning to Cynthia Idriss-Miller’s four overlapping categories of the far right, it is helpful to place them within Berger’s extremist framework (Miller-Idriss uses Berger’s definition of extremism in her work Hate in the Homeland). For those who identify with the “antigovernment and antidemocratic practices and ideals” in-group, the government and those who support it are seen as the outgroup and hostile actions are taken to try to undermine and ultimately destroy democratic governments. We see this both in the United States with the rising popularity of groups like the Oath Keepers (Jackson, 2020), who helped plan the January 6, 2021, attack on the US capitol building (Follman & Friedman, 2021) and in Germany with far right infiltration of law enforcement and military. Personnel clandestinely join far right groups that aim to eliminate Germany’s democratic government, which will occur on the much anticipated Day X. This has led to the disbandment of an elite military unit, reorganizations of police units, expulsions from the force, and criminal trials (Bennhold, K., 2021).

The far right category of exclusionary beliefs encompasses a large variety of extremist groups where the in-group hates and targets the out-group (or groups) for hostile action due to their identity. Popular targets today include Black Lives Matter, LGBTQ+ individuals and groups, Asian Americans (a renewed target as a result of anti-Asian rhetoric related to the Covid 19 pandemic), Jews, women perceived to be or self-identified as feminists, and Muslims. Ethnonationalism is a potent force that is not only growing amongst “whites” in North America and Europe, but also in India as Hindu nationalists on the right target Muslims, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Leidig, 2020, February; Roy, 2021).

Currently the in-group that best exemplifies existential threats and conspiracies category of the far right is QAnon. While there are many narratives amongst QAnon beliefs, essential to them all is that Democratic elites in the United States and Hollywood actors are part of a “cabal” that former President Donald Trump will save the world from. This conspiracy theory has spread from the United States to Europe, finding popularity especially in France (Gilbert, 2021). Many of the attackers on the US Capitol on January 6 were followers of QAnon (Rubin et al., 2021). The followers of Q, who is believed to have had top level access to government secrets, refer to “the storm” as the day when the evil elites will be taken down by the return of Donald Trump. This leads to the last category, apocalyptic fantasies. Those that fall in this in-group want to accelerate what they see as the inevitable end. Often this means that their self-identified ingroup, usually white, Christian and patriarchal will assume power, which means there would be several out-groups, all of whom would be eliminated, by violence in a race war, a revolution, or by sending them elsewhere.

Historical Overview of the Online Presence of the Far Right

The far right adopted the use of the internet early. By 1984 there were three different computer bulletin board systems (BBS): Info. International Network, Aryan Liberty Net, and White Aryan Resistance (W.A.R.) Net (Berlet, 2001). These early online far right networks were a way for individuals with home computers, modems, and phone lines to dial into and log onto the BBS system. On the BBS, individuals were able to access a directory of files for download. Features that were quickly added included the ability to post public messages, read text, and exchange group files (Berlet, 2001). The very first far right BBS was created by George P. Dietz, a well-known publisher of antisemitic and racist works, whose welcome message on the site said it was “The only computer bulletin board system and uncontrolled information medium in the United States of America dedicated to the dissemination of historical facts—not fiction!” (Berlet, 2001, p. 2). Launched in March of 1984, by June of that same year the directory of the BBS listed ten different sections of information, including sections entitled: “Holocaust: Fact or Fiction?” “The Jew in Review,” and “On Race and Religion” (Berlet, 2001, p. 2). Shortly after the creation of Dietz’s BBS, Klan leader and influential far right personality, Louis Beam launched Aryan Liberty Net, with the help (and probably funds) of Richard Butler, the leader of the Aryan Nations Christian Identity located in Hayden Lake, Idaho (Berlet, 2001; ADL, 1985). This BBS posted the following all caps message in June of 1985:

FINALLY, WE ARE ALL GOING TO BE LINKED TOGETHER AT ONE POINT IN TIME. IMAGINE IF YOU WILL, ALL OF THE GREAT MINDS OF THE PATRIOTIC CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT LINKED TOGETHER AND JOINED INTO ONE COMPUTER. ALL THE YEARS OF COMBINED EXPERIENCE AVAILABLE TO THE MOVEMENT. NOW IMAGINE BEING ABLE TO CALL UP AND ACCESS THOSE MINDS, TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES THAT AFFECT HIM. YOU ARE ONLINE WITH THE ARYAN NATIONS BRAIN TRUST. IT IS HERE TO SERVE THE FOLK. (Berlet, 2001, p. 4).

One of the goals of the BBS, according to Beam, was to allow users in Canada and Europe, where much of the hate literature was censored, access to it (ADL, 1985). White Aryan Resistance leader Tom Metzger noted that “White Aryan comrades of the North have destroyed the free speech blackout to our Canadian comrades” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4), and when he created the W.A.R. Computer Terminal BBS by late 1984 or early 1985, he sent out a message to “any Aryan patriot in America” (Berlet, 2001, p. 4). From the start the far right presence on the internet was not only to spread hate and propaganda, but also to create transnational collaboration.

From that point the far right expanded into the internet with the innovation of web 1.0, these are the earliest type of websites that were read only, though over time they became more involved with links and more engaging audiovisual content (Baele et al., 2020). The most influential was probably Stormfront, a white supremacist website and message board created by Ku Klux Klan leader Don Black. Stormfront is still active and counts over 800,000 monthly visits as well as providing 1,800 interlinked websites (Stern, 2019). Types of far right examples of web 1.0 include websites that provide far right content, blogs that do the same as well as offer commentary, far right publishers, and far right commercial sites selling merchandise (Baele, et al, 2020). The far right were also early adopters of web 2.0, or platforms centered around user driven content and interactions (Conway et al., 2019). Popular sites include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, and Reddit. When the bigger names in social media have deplatformed far right actors and groups, some have migrated to newer, less used social media platforms like Gab, Parler, and Discord. Other forums, like the various “chans” offer anonymous spaces for far right activity (Baele et al, 2020). Less well known and studied are the far right wikis, in which are far right versions of encyclopedias and are even translated into several languages (Baele et al., 2020).

Imagery Types

Imagery is foundational to the far right and it is both prominent and prolific in both physical and cyberspaces. For the purposes of this study, imagery is observed to determine how it facilitates the interaction between cyber and physical spaces. Two areas are of importance: the types of imagery and the medium on which the imagery is presented. In the literature review of the following chapter, these two facets of imagery are further explored.

Summary

The far right is a multi-faceted, heterogenous extremist movement that has increased its presence online and in physical spaces. The following chapters of this thesis include a literature review of the far right, using theoretical frameworks from social science and studies conducted among the far right regarding online spaces, offline spaces, and the imagery types and mediums, followed by chapters on the methods and results of the audio and visual analysis conducted to explore the research question. The study closes with a section of conclusions and recommendations for future research.